The Annual Register
Excerpt, pp. 133-141:
As soon as Lord Howe had received intelligence of the success at the. Brandywine, and the determined progress of the army to Philadelphia, he took the most speedy and effectual measures for conducting the fleet and transports round to the Delaware, not only to be at hand to concur in the active operations of the campaign, but to supply the army with those provisions, stores, and necessaries, which he knew, must by that time .... e been indispensably necessary. The voyage was intricate, tedious, and dangerous; and nothing less than the superior skill and ability which was exerted, in the conduct and management of so great a number of ships, could have prevented the loss from being considerable. As the passage to Philadelphia was yet impracticable, the fleet drew up and anchored along the western or Pennsylvania shore, from Reedy Island to Newcastle.
When the British troops had taken possession of Philadelphia, their first object was the erecting of batteries to command the river, as well to prevent the intercourse of the American vessels between their upper and lower posts, as to protect the city from any insult by water. The necessity of this measure became obvious, almost, as soon as it was determined upon. The very day after the arrival of the forces, the American frigate Delaware, of 32 guns, anchored within 500 yards of the unfinished batteries, and being seconded by another frigate, with some smaller vessels, they commenced, and supported for some hours, a very heavy cannonade, both upon the batteries and the town. They did not, however, display the judgment, which their knowledge of the river might be supposed to afford. Upon the falling of the tide the Delaware grounded so effectually that she could not be got off, which being soon perceived by the grenadiers, they brought their battalion field pieces to play upon her with so true a direction and excellent effect, that the Delaware being obliged to strike her colours, was boarded and taken by an officer and detachment of that corps. Brigadier-General Cleveland immediately profited of the effect of the battalion guns by directing the whole fire of the batteries to the other vessels, which were compelled to retire, with the loss of a schooner which was driven ashore.
The Americans had at vast expence, and with wonderful labour and industry, constructed great and numerous works, to render the passage of the Delaware up to Philadelphia impracticable. In the prosecution of this design, they had erected works and batteries upon a flat, low, marshy island, or rather a bank of mud and sand, which had been accumulated in the Delaware near the junction of the Schuylkill, and which from its nature was called Mud, but from these defences, Fort-Island. On the opposite shore of New Jersey, at a place called Red-Bank, they had also constructed a fort or redoubt, well covered with heavy artillery. In the deep navigable channel, between, or under the cover of there batteries, they had sunk several ranges of frames or machines, to which, from a resemblance in the construction, they had given the appellation of chevaux de frize, being composed of transverse beams, firmly united, pointing in various directions, and strongly headed with iron. These were of such a weight and strength, and sunk in such a depth of water, as rendered them equally difficult to be weighed or cut through, and destructive to any ship which had the misfortune of striking against them. No attempt for raising them, or for opening the channel in any manner, could, however, be made, until the command of the shores on both sides was fully obtained.
About three miles lower down the river, they had sunk other ranges of there machines, and were constructing for their protection some considerable and extensive works, which, though not yet finished, were in such forwardness as to be provided with artillery, and to command their object, at a place on tho Jersey side called Billing's Point. These works and machines were further supported by several gallies mounting heavy cannon, together with two floating batteries, a number of armed vessels and small craft of various kinds, and some fire ships. In a word, the Delaware seemed to teem with every defensive preparation, which could render the hostile operations and movements of a fleet, in the confined and uncertain navigation of a river, extremely dangerous.
Upon the representation of Captain Hammond, of the Roebuck, who with some other ships of war had arrived in the Delaware before Lord Howe, the General detached two regiments, consisting of three battalions, under Colonel Stirling, to dislodge the enemy from Billingsfort. The detachment having crossed the river from Chester, where the ships lay, performed the service effectually without loss or opposition.
Oct. 1st The enemy, without waiting to be attacked, as soon as they heard of their approach, immediately spiked their artillery, set fire to the barracks, and abandoned the place with the greatest precipitation. The detachment waited to destroy, or to render unserviceable, those parts of the works which fronted the river. This success, with the spirit and perseverance exhibited by the officers and crews of the ships under his command, enabled Captain Hammond, through great difficulties, and a vigorous opposition from the marine force of the enemy, to carry the principal object of the expedition into effect, by cutting away and weighing up so much of the chevaux-de-frize, as opened a narrow and difficult passage for ships through this lower barrier.
Upon the return of the detachment from Jersey, another regiment was sent to meet them at Chester, in order that they might altogether form a sufficient escort for a large convoy of provisions to the camp. The army still lay at German-Town, a very long and considerable village, about half a dozen miles from Philadelphia, and which, stretching on both sides of the great road to the northward, forms a continued street of two miles in length. The line of encampment crossed German-Town at right angles about the center, the left wing extending on the west from the town to the Schuylkill. That wing was covered in front, by the mounted aud dismounted German chasseurs; a battalion of light infantry, and the Queen's American rangers, were in the front of the right; and the 40th regiment, with another battalion of light infantry, were posted at the head of the village. Lord Cornwallis lay at Philade!phia, with four battalions of grenadiers; and we have already seen, that three regiments had been detached on the side of Chester.
The enemy were encamped at Skippach Creek, about 16 miles from German-Town. They had JeCehr.ed some reinforcements, and they were not ignorant that the royal army was weakened by the detachments it had made to Philadelphia and Chester. These circumstances induced an enterprize, little expected, and seemingly as little suited, to the general caution, and to the supposed genius and disposition of Washington. Instead of shunning, as usual, every thing that might lead to an action, the American army quitted its strong post at Skippach Creek at six in the evening, and marched all night to surprize and attack the royal army in its camp at German-Town.
4th At three o'clock in the morning, their approach was discovered by the patroles, and the army was immediately called to arms. They began their attack upon the 40th regiment, and the battalion of light infantry by which it was accompanied. These corps, after a vigorous resistance, being at length overpowered by numbers, were pressed and pursued into the village. In this exigence, a measure upon which much of the future fortune of the day depended, was instantly and happily adopted by Lieutenant-Colonel Musgrave, who threw himself with six companies of the 40th regiment into a large and strong stone house, which lay full in the front of the enemy.
By this measure they were checked in their forward hope and design of gaining complete and immediate possession of that long town; which among other great and obvious advantages, would have enabled them effectually to separate the right and left wings of the royal army. The Colonel and his brave party, surrounded by a whole brigade, and attacked on every side with great resolution, defended the house with the most undaunted courage; and though the enemy at length brought cannon, up to the assault, he still maintained his post with equal intrepidity, pouring a dreadful and unceasing fire through the windows, until affairs had taken such a turn as afforded him relief.
This was accomplished by Major-General Grey, who bringing the front of a great part of the lett wing by a timely movement to the village, led on three battalions of the 3d brigade, who attacked the enemy with vigour, and were as bravely supported and seconded, by Brigadier-General Agnew, at the head of the 4th brigade. The engagement was now for some time very warm; but the enemy being attacked on the opposite side of the village by two regiments of the right wing, were thrown into total disorder, and driven out of the town with considerable slaughter.
In the mean time, the light infantry and pickets of the right wing, supported by the 4th, and seconded by the 49th regiment, were warmly engaged with the enemy's left; but General Grey, after forcing their troops in the village, having passed it, and bringing the left wing forward, they immediately retired on all sides. The enemy was pursued for some miles; but the country being woody, strong, and enclosed, the pursuit was attended with so little effect, that they carried their cannon clear off. Lord Coniwallis arrived with a squadron of lighthorse from Philadelphia, towards the close of the engagement, and joined in the pursuit whilst three battalions of grenadiers from the same place, who had run themselves out of breath in the ardour of succouring their fellows, were too lale to come in for any share of the action.
It appears that the morning was exceedingly soggy, to which the Americans (who had considerahle succcss in the beginning of the action) attribute their not improving the advantages they at first gained, in the manner which they would otherwise have done. For they were not only, as they assert, through this circumstance, prevented from observing the true situation of the enemy, by which the latter had time to recover from the effect of the first impression they had made on them; but the different bodies of their own army were kept in ignorance of each others movements and success, and were consequently incapable of acting in concert. It is even said, that some of their parties, in the thickness of the fog, had poured their fire upon each other under a blind mistake on both sides of being engaged with the enemy. Washington paid great compliments to the right wing for its good behaviour, of which he had been a witness, but he left the conduct of the left, at least, doubtful, by saying that he had not yet received sufficient information to found any opinion on.
The loss of the royal army in this action, including the wounded and a few prisoners, rather exceeded that at the Brandywine, the whole amounting to 535; but the proportion of slain was still smaller than in that engagement, and scarcely exceeded 70. In this number were unhappily some very brave and distinguished officers; particularly Brigadier-General Agnew, and Lieutenant Colonel Bird. The number of officers wounded was considerable. The American loss was estimated in the Gazette, at between 200 and 300 slain, 600 wounded, and above 400 prisoners.
Among the slain was General Nash, and several other officers of all ranks; 54 officers were taken prisoners. In this action the Americans acted upon the offensive; and though repulsed with loss, shewed themselves a formidable adversary; capable of charging with resolution, and retreating with good order. The hope therefore entertained from the effect of any fair action with them as decisive and likely to put a speedy termination to the war, was exceedingly abated.
The taking of Philadelphia was not attended with all the advantages expected from that conquest. The rebel army, however straitned, still kept the field; and until the Delaware could be cleared, it was obvious, that the army could not support itself in that town for the winter. Therefore, as the whole effect of the campaign depended upon that operation, about a fortnight after the battle, the King's army removed from German-Town to Philadelphia, as being a more convenient situation for the reduction of Mud, or Fort Island, and for co-operating with the naval force in opening the navigation of the river. The enemy had returned after the action at German-Town, to their old camp at Skippach Creek, where they still continued.
Measures being concerted between the General and Admiral for removing the obstructions of the river, the former ordered batteries to be erected on the western shore, or Pennsylvania side, in hopes of assisting in dislodging the enemy from Mud Island, the difficulty of access to which, was found to render its redattion I mach more tedious and difficult operation than had been expected. He also detached a strong body of Hessians across the river at Cooper's Ferry, opposite the town, who were to march down and force the redoubt of Red Bank, whilst the ships, and the batteries on the other side, were to carry on their attacks against Mud Island and the enemy's marine force. The Hessian detachment was led by Colonel Donop, (who had gained great reputation in various actions of this war) and consisted, besides light infantry and chasseurs, of three battalions of grenadiers, and the regiment of Mirbach. The American force at Red Bank was estimated at about 800 men.
Though nothing could exceed the good dispostions made for these several attacks, nor the exertions of vigour and courage displayed both by the land and naval force on their different elements, yet this enterprize not only failed of success, but was in every respect unfortunate. Oct. 22. Colonel Donop attacked the enemy's entrenchments with the utmost gallantry, and after a very sharp action, succeeded in carrying an extensive out-work; but he found the enemy better covered in the body of the redoubt, and the defence more vigorous than he expected. The brave Colonel was there mortally wounded and taken prisoner. Several of his best officers were killed or disabled, and the Heslians, after a desperate engagement, were repulsed with great loss. Colonel Mingerode, the next in command, being likewise dangerously wounded, the detachment was brought of by Lieutenant-Colonel Linsing, having suffered much in the approach to and retreat from the assault, by the fire of the enemy's gallies and floating batteries. The loss of the Hessians, whether as to private men or officers, was never particularly authenticated; it was, however, known to be very considerable: probably not less than four or five hundred men.
The men of war and frigates destined for the attack, having made their way with difficulty through the lower barrier, took every possible disposition that the nature and situation of the river would admit for the destruction of the upper works and defences, where they commenced their assault at the same time that Colonel Donop was engaged at Red Bank. Fortune was not more favourable here than ashore. The ships could not bring their fire to bear with any great effect upon the works. The extraordinary obstructions with which the enemy had interrupted the free course of the river, had even affected its bed, and wrought some alteration in its known and natural channel. By this means, the Augusta man of war, and Merlin sloop, were grounded so fast at some distance from the chevaux-de-frize, that there was no posiibility of getting them off. In this situation, though the skill and courage of the officers and crews of the several vessels, prevented the effect of four fire ships which the enemy had sent to destroy the Augusta, she unfortunately took fire in the engagement, which placed the others under a necessity of retiring with the utmost expedition, to get beyond the effect of the explosion. In these urgent and difficult circumstances, the Merlin was hastily evacuated, and laid in a train of destruction, and the greater part of the officers and crew of the Augusta saved; but the second Lieutenant, Chaplain, and Gunner, with no inconsiderable number of the common men, unhappily perished.
The ill success of this enterprize, by no means damped the resolution of the commanders, in prosecution of the absolutely necessary work of opening the navigation of the Delaware. New ground was taken, new measures adopted, and every preparation made that could insure success to the design. Nor were the enemy idle on their side. They well understood the great consequence it was of to them to keep the naval force separated from the army, and to render the communication between them tedious and difficult. They accordingly left nothing undone to strengthen their defences.
The officers and seamen of the fleet were incessantly employed in conveying heavy artillery, provisions and stores, up the river, by a difficult channel on the west side, to a small morassy island, where they erected batteries, which greatly incommoded the enemy's works on Mud Island.
Nov. 15th. Every thing being prepared for an attack, the Isis, and Somerset, men of war, passed up the east channel, in order to attack the enemy's works in front; several frigates drew up against a fort newly erected on the Jersey side, near Manto Creek, which was so situated as to flank the men of war in their station; and two armed vessels, mounted with 24 pounders, successfully made their way through the narrow channel on the western side at the back of Hogg Island; a matter of the greatest importance with respect to the success of the attack, as there two vessels, in concert with the batteries newly erected in Province Island, enfiladed the principal works which the enemy had erected on Mud Island.
A heavy fire was supported on both sides. At length, the vigorous attack made by the Isis in front, and by the two armed vessels and the batteries in other quarters, so overpowered the enemy in the fort and works on Mud Island, that towards evening their artillery was entirely silenced. And they perceiving that measures were taking for forcing their works on the following morning, and being also sensible that, in the present state of things, they were not defensible, they set fire to every thing that was capable of receiving it, and abandoned the place in the night.
The loss of the enemy in men was said to be very considerable; that of the fleet, was more trifling than could have been supposed. Their artillery and some stores were taken at Mud Island. In two days after, Lord Cornwallis passed over with a detachment from Chester to Billing's Fort, where he was joined by a body of forces just arrived from New York. They proceeded all together to Red Bank, which the enemy abandoned at their approach, leaving their artillery with a considerable quantity of cannonball and stores behind them. The works were demolished.
The enemy's shipping having now lost all protection on either side of the river, several of their gallies and other armed vessels took advantage of a favorable,
night, to pass the batteries of Philadelpbia, and escape to places of security farther up. The discovery of this transaction occasioned the sending an officer with a party of seamen to man the Delaware frigate lately taken, and lying at Philadelphia, and the taking of such other measures, as rendered the escaping of the remainder impracticable. Thus environed, the crews abandoned and set fire to their vessels, which were all consumed to the amount of seventeen of different sorts, including the two floating batteries, and fireships. With all these advantages, the season of the year, and other impediments, rendered the clearing of the river, in any considerable degree, impracticable; so that the making or discovering of such a channel, as might admit the passage of transports and vessels of easy burden with provisions and necessaries for the use of the army at Philadelphia; was all that could be obtained at present.
General Washington being reinforced by 4000 men from the northern army, advanced within 14 miles of Philadelphia, to a place called White Marth, where he encamped in a very strong position with his right to the Wissahichon Creek, and the front partly covered by Sandy Run. As this movement seemed to indicate a disposition to adventure, General Howe was not without hopes, that the late reinforcement would encourage them to hazard a battle for the recovery of Philadelphia. If such was their intention, he was determined that they should not cool in it, for want of an opportunity of bringing it into action; or if they still adhered their usual system of caution and defence, it was still reasonably to be hoped that upon a close inspection of their situation, some part of their camp would be found so vulnerable as to admit of
succesaful impresiion.
Upon these grounds the General matched the army from Philadelphia on the 4th of December at night, and took post on Chessnut Hill, in the front of the enemy's right on the next morning. Finding that their right afforded no opening for an attack, he changed his ground before day on the 7th, and took a new position opposite to their center and left. Some skirmishes happened, in which the enemy were constantly defeated, and their fiying parties pursued home almost to their works. The General, at length, after continuing above three days constantly in their fight, advancing within a mile of their lines, and examining their works with the closest attention, finding that nothing could provoke or entice them to action, and that their camp was in every part inaccessible, gave up the prosecution of a design which was evidently fruitless. The army also suffered greatly from the severity of the weather, both officers and soldiers being totally destitute of tents and field equipage.
The General accordingly began his march to Philadelphia on the afternoon of the 8th, in full view of the enemy, without being pursued, or in the smallest degree incommoded on his return. As the season was now too far advanced, to admit of any other attention than what related to the accommodation of the army, a grand detachment was sent out to procure forage for the winter, which was successfully performed. In the mean time, Washington removed his camp from White Marsh to Valley Forge, upon the SchuylkiIl, about 15 or 16 miles from Philadelphia, in a very strong, and consequently secure position. Nothing could afford a stronger proof, to whoever considers the nature and disposition of those people, of the unbounded influence on the minds both of his officers and men which that General possessed, than his being able, not only to keep them together, but to submit to the incommmodities and distresses incident to living in a hutted camp, during the severe winter of that climate, and where all his supplies of provision and stores must come from a great distance, at much expence and no small hazard. It was also a proof with many others, of the general strong disposition of America, to suffer all things rather than submit to force.
Such was the issue of the campaign upon the Delaware. A campaign which affords much room for the most serious reflection. The British arms were crowned with the most brilliant success. Two very considerable victories were obtained. In all lesser actions, bating the affair at Red Bank, they were equally triumphant. Yet with all this tide of success, all the fruit derived from our victories at the close of the campaign, amounted to no more than simply a good winter lodging for our army in the city of Philadelphia; whilst the troops possessed no more of the adjacent country than what they immediately commanded with their arms. It was still more discouraging, that the enemy had given repeated proofs, that however he might engage them when he thought it to his advantage, it was impossible for the royal army to bring him to action against consent. this gave occasion to much uneasiness in England; where the news of the first successes had caused the greatest exultation, which was now succeeded with very gloomy reflections on the pecular and fatal circumstances, which from the nature of the country, ·and other co-operating causes, had distinguished this war, from all others in which we had ever been concerned; and in which victory and defeat were nearly productive of the same consequences.
Burke, Edmund (Editor). The Annual Register for the Year 1777. J. Dodsley (London: 1779).